Lord Nelson Class Pre-Dreadnoughts

The Lord Nelson class were  conceived at a time when the evolution of the battleship was undergoing radical changes. Lessons from the Russo-Japanese War (1904 to 1905) seemed to imply that in the future engagement ranges would increase to a distance where secondary batteries would be of far less important and maybe even redundant. It was also felt in some schools of thought  that the lower rate of fire from the big guns, at closer ranges and in poor viability, the intermediate calibre might overwhelm the all big guns ship.  We know in hindsight the all 'big-gun-ship' or the dreadnought was vindicated in the end, but at the conception of the dreadnought no one knew sure which way the battleship would evolve over the next decade. The Admiralty conceived the Dreadnought project, but also the Lord Nelson class at similar times.  A two horse race and if Dreadnought horse took a tumble, then nothing was lost, as they still had the Lord  Nelson's in the race.

(The Lord Nelson's and Dreadnought impacted on each other, so a comparison is for me, necessary. As you read on you'll find Dreadnought's statistics noted in the bracket styled《 》. It will in places be confusing on the eyes but I feel its both an interesting and relevant comparison. Plus I've added some  notes at the end of this series, so [ ] means, there's a note. OK back to the post).

The Lord Nelson's were designed and laid down in the midst of big gun debate, in 1904/5 《1905》. Hindsight shows they were redundant on conception and  never during their years of service would they  for one second be feted as the cutting edge of naval design, the best in design. They were obsolete from the moment their keels were laid. Maybe their the only capital ships to have been so?

Sir Phillip Watts first foray into battleship design was with the  Lord Nelson's. They followed the pattern established by their predecessors, the Royal Sovereign-class of 1890s in that they had two twin 12" main battery mounts, one fore and one aft. That aside they were a  departure from previous British pre-dreadnought designs and but for the Dreadnought, they might have been the ones to marked a new era in pre-dreadnought design.

In the response  to foreign battleships of similar displacement, the preceding King Edward VII-class battleships had been fitted with 9.2-inch intermediate battery and a 6 inch secondary battery. The Lord Nelson's went further along this path with an all 9.2-inch secondary battery. The exclusion of the 6 inch guns was a new idea and not since HMS Inflexible of 1881 had British battleships not carried a 6" battery [4]. Their 9.2-inch battery was mounted in turrets (four double and two single) on the upper deck, rather than on the main deck in a central battery or casemates. This solution eliminated the problem of being unable to work the secondary battery in a seaway. This removed a problem of the British battleships with main-deck-mounted or casement secondary armament which were washed out in all but the calmest weather.

The main calibre 12 inch guns were a new and more powerful 45-calibre design. Both main calibre gun and turrets  were the same model and type,  as those to be carried by the Dreadnought. In fact  the completion of Lord Nelson and Agamemnon was delayed when their main battery guns and mountings were diverted to Dreadnought to speed her completion up in 1906[3].
It was found in the end, that the mixed-calibre heavy armament proved problematic, as their gunnery officers found it impossible to distinguish between 12-inch  and 9.2-inch shell splashes, making fire control impractical. This served to vindicate the dreadnought design and to leave them the undisputed kings of the worlds navies. The all big gun design  had been mooted for the Lord Nelson's in January 1905, but their design was too far advanced by then to be changed, and the all-big-gun experiment  had to wait for the Dreadnought.

A battery of 12 pounders was retained in the design for anti-torpedo-boat work. They were to be  mounted on a large flying deck amidships, which would allow a good field of fire. However their sighting lead to criticism as it  made them both a good target and in combat falling debris due to any damage received  might fall on the 9.2-inch turrets below. In addition some officers felt the 12-pounder to be too light to deal with more modern and larger torpedo boats.

As larger calibre guns  became more common in 'enemy'  battleships, it became apparent that greater protection was going needed than had been thought in the previous classes. As a result the Lord Nelson's main armour belt was increased in the design stage to twelve inches depth over the machinery spaces and magazines. The armour belt in the King Edward VII-class battleships,  (the  preceding class), was never deeper than nine inches  thick along it's length. 

The Lord Nelson's were more heavily armoured than any previous  British pre-dreadnought, and even  more heavily armored in terms of the area and thickness than any of the dreadnoughts prior to the Orion class of 1909 and possibly the first of the 'super dreadnoughts'?. They were the first British battleships to follow the same concept the Germans had,  in  using solid watertight bulkheads, with no doors or pipes, (experience in the Russo-Japanese War had suggested that such bulkheads were some use in keeping warships from sinking). The idea being to trap any  seawater into the separate compartments and to contain the flooding.  Access between the compartments would be  via lifts ( there must have been a ladder in addition for use in combat?). The lack of direct access between compartments proved unpopular with the crews  due to  the inconvenience it imposed, and as result was not repeated in the earlier dreadnoughts.  To add additional protection, each compartment in the  Lord Nelson's was fitted with its own ventilation and pumping arrangements, removing  the need for a single ship wide drainage system as had been installed in the previous British battleships and this was seen as a possible weakness during flooding.

Dry dock limitations caused both ship's to be designed shorter overall. There size limitations permitted them to fit dry docks the previous classes of battleships could not access.  These limitations resulted in two ship's smaller than the earlier King Edward VII-class battleships and with a  cramped interior space. However these restrictions meant both the vessels were fairly flat-bottomed. Combined with the heavy 9.2 inch guns and their turrets the Nelson's were unusually resistant to rolling and gained a reputation as both good sea boats and steady gun platforms.

The size restrictions did necessitate  a compromises in the 9.2-inch battery. The smaller ships beam forced the abandonment of mounting the ten 9.2 inch guns in five twin turrets, but instead eight of the guns in four twin and two in single turrets. The space problems, and limitations on the size of the of the 9.2-inch turrets resulted in being cramped enough in service to impair the rate of fire of the guns.

They were to be the last British battleships to have reciprocating engines and  twin propellers. The future classes would have both turbines and four propellers. They also were the last to have inward-turning screws, which allowed greater propulsive force and as a result slightly higher speeds and less fuel consumption. But they were unpopular  also  because this all combined to make ships less manoeuvrable at low speeds or when going astern. It was also decided to stop using mixed boiler types in the same ship, and both had 15 uniform, large water-tube boilers. Babcock & Wilcox boilers in Lord Nelson and Yarrow boilers in Agamemnon. Although mainly  coal powered, they were also the first British battleships designed to carry oil, (preceding ship's had to be retrofitted to carry oil). The Lord Nelson's had six oil sprayers and Agamemnon five, and this system extended their range considerably.Both ships could easily make their design speed of 18 knots. During her trials the Lord Nelson made 18.7 knots  and Agamemnon made 18.5 knots.

The Lord Nelson's were also  the last British battleships to have an armoured ram built into their bow shape. Lord Nelson's cost was £1,651,339《 £1,785,683》and the Agamemnon's £1,652,347 (£1008 difference) . Equivalent to about £110,000,000 in 2005 prices.

So to summarise. The Lord Nelson's had a displacement of 16,500 《18,120》long tons  and a deep load of 17,683《18,410》long tons. Their hull length was 443 ft 6 in (135.2 m) 《527 ft (160.6 m)》 the beam 79 ft 6 in (24.2 m) 《82 ft 1 in (25.0 m)》and a draught of 26 ft 9 in (8.2 m) 《29 ft 7.5 in (9.0 m) (deep load)》. See told you, confusing!
Propulsion was from two 4-cylinder, vertical triple expansion steam engines and 15 coal and oil-fired water-tube boilers allowing an installed power of 16,750 ihp (12,490 kW),《 Installed power,23,000 shp (17,000 kW)18 Babcock & Wilcox boilers,4 shafts; 2 steam turbine sets.  Two screws provided a speed of 18 knots 《21》. Their endurance range was 9,180 nautical miles at 10 knots 《6,620 nmi (12,260 km; 7,620 mi) at 10 knots》. The crew numbered between 800 and 817 men ,《700-810》.
Armament as was four 12-inch Mk X guns 《5 × twin 12-inch (305 mm) guns》in twin turrets giving a shooting range of 20,435 yards @ 16° (11.6 miles), with a 859 lb. armor piercing shell.

Ten 9.2-inch Mk XI guns in four twin and two single turrets with a range of  16,200 yards @ 15° (9.2 miles) using a  380 lb. armor piercing shell.

Twenty four  QF 12-pounder 18 cwt guns 《27 × single 12-pdr (76 mm) 》 with a range of 11,750 yards at 40°. In addition they had an AA ceiling 19,000' at 70° and two 3-pounder guns, all mounted in single units.

Five 17.72-inch torpedo tubes.800 yards at 26.5 knots. Twenty three torpedoes were carried for resupply.《5 × 18-inch (450 mm) torpedo tubes》.

'Two tubes were  forward and depressed by one degree and angled 10 degrees before the beam. The axis of the tube was eleven feet below the load water line and 2 foot 5 inches above the deck.
The two aft tubes were also , depressed 1 degree and angled at 25 degrees abaft the beam, with an axis of tube 11 feet below load water line and 2 foot 5 inches above the deck.
The stern tube was like wise depressed 1 degree, an axis of tube 7 feet below load water line and 1 foot 6 inches above the deck'. [1]

In 1909 a decision was made  for the vessels  to carry 10 heater torpedoes, distributed with six in the forward submerged flat, two in the aft, and two at the stern tube. The aim, when stocks were available, was to have the ten heaters torpedoes, (Mark VI* H. or Mark VI** H). In 1913, it was agreed to replace the torpedoes on the ships with Mark VI** H. or Mark VI*** H. torpedoes.

The ships were never to received directors for their main or secondary batteries and the ship's guns were organized into 3 groups:
1:Two 12-in turrets.
2:Starboard 9.2-in turrets
3:Port 9.2-in turrets.
These ships were  never received Dreyer tables[2]. The ship's  were the first battleship class in the Royal Navy to have Target Visible and Gun Ready signals, with indications of which turret could see the target and which guns were ready being visible in the 'TSes' and control positions. In September 1914, the ships were allowed four additional pairs of Pattern 343 Service Binoculars.

The belt armour was 12 in (305 mm)    《4–11 in (102–279 mm》 and the deck armour 1 to 4 in (25–102 mm)   《0.75–3 in (19–76 mm)》. The barbettes were armoured between 3 and 12 in (76–305 mm)  《4–11 in (102–279 mm)》  while the main  gun turrets were covered in  12 to 13.5 in (305–343 mm) 《3–12 in (76–305 mm)》armour.  The secondary gun turrets had 3 to 7 in (76–178 mm) and the conning tower 12 in (305 mm)  《11 in (279 mm)》. Bulkheads were 8 in (203 mm)   11 in (279 mm)《8 in (203 mm)》.

The class's lead ship the Lord Nelson was laid down at the Palmers yard in Jarrow on 18 May 1905《02.10.1905》. Her launch date was the 4 September 1906 《10.10.02. 1906》and she commissioned into service on the 1 December 1908 《02.12.06》. The delay in completion was  a result of  her 12-inch  guns and turrets being diverted to accelerate  completion of Dreadnought [3]. While she was not the last pre-dreadnought laid down for the Royal Navy, she was the last to be completed.

The Lord Nelson was first commissioned into the  reserve on 1 December 1908 at Chatham Dockyard, was attached to the Nore Division of the Home Fleet with a nucleus crew.  On 5th January 1909 she finally went into full commission to relieve the battleship HMS Magnificent as flagship of the Nore Division, Home Fleet, and in April was to became part of the First Division, Home Fleet.

The  Agamemnon was ordered in 1904 and was the first warship to built by the William Beardmore and Company's Dalmuir Naval Construction Works, which necessitated the yards construction! She was laid down on 15 May 1905 and launched on 23 June 1906 even before the dockyards themselves were finished. Her completion was to be delayed by labour troubles and as with her sister, by the diversion of the 12-inch guns to the  Dreadnought[3]. She was completed in June 1908, six months before her sister Lord Nelson.

HMS Agamemnon commissioned into service on the 25 June 1908 at the Chatham Dockyard for service, like her sister,  in the Nore Division of the Home Fleet. By the time of her delayed completion five dreadnought class battleships and the three Invincible class battlecruisers had  been launched.

At the end of 1909, both ships were ordered to received one of eleven Short Distance Radio Sets, to be installed at their next refit behind armour near the fore bridge. These were intended to supplant flag signaling.

On the 11 February 1911, Agamemnon grazed an uncharted rock in the harbour at Ferrol, Spain, and damaged her hull's bottom.

The two ships were transferred in January 1911 to the Second Division of the Home Fleet, and in May 1912 to the 2nd Battle Squadron. Both were temporarily attached in September 1913 to the 4th Battle Squadron and in April 1914, Lord Nelson relieved the battleship HMS Queen as Flagship, Vice Admiral, Channel Fleet.

July 1914 saw Agamemnon as still part of the fourth BS, but on the outbreak of War, she joined her sister ship in the Channel Fleet. The Lord Nelson was serving as the flagship of Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, and Agamemnon formed part of the 5th Battle Squadron which  was based at Portland. The ChanneI Fleets main role at this stage of the war was to protect the BEF as it crossed the channel to France.

On 14 November 1914  Agamemnon and Lord Nelson  were transferred to Sheerness to guard the  coast against the possibility of a German invasion. They both were  to return to Portland on 30 December 1914 and from there was employed in the defence of the southern ports of England and carrying out patrols of the English Channel until February 1915.

The new year saw both ships as still part of  the Channel Fleet, but it was then decided to despatch the Agamemnon and Lord Nelson to join the fleet stationed off the Dardanelles. Agamemnon sailed on the 9 February 1915,  from Portland and took ten days to reach her new station.The Lord Nelson was detached from the Channel fleet and sailed South on the 15 February, arriving eight days later.

Agamemnon arrived on the second day of the opening bombardment on the Ottoman Turkish forts which guard the entrance to the Dardanelles. On her arrival she was to immediately join in on the bombardment. She was also to take part in the shelling of the inner forts later in the month. On the 25th February Agamemnon was hit by seven 9.4-inch shells in the space of ten minutes. She was holed above the waterline and suffered three dead.

Lord Nelson had arrived off the Dardanelles by early March and the two ships formed the 2nd sub-division of Division 1 of the battleship fleet. On the 4th March both ships  supported the amphibious landings and participated in another bombardment on two days later. On the 7th March Agamemnon came under heavy fire from Fort Hamidieh, receiving  eight hits from large-calibre shells. One hit was reputedly from a of 14-inch , which blew a large hole in her quarterdeck, wrecking both the wardroom and the gunroom. The hit also sent splinters from the deck armour into the maintop 100 yards above. She also received  several hits by lighter shells that day, and, although she suffered damage to her superstructure, her fighting and steaming capabilities were not seriously lessened. 

Nelson was also to receive several hits, including one by a stone cannonball which landed on the deck and was to kept as a souvenir by the Flag Officer, Arthur Baker, at Longcross Church. She suffered damage to her superstructure and rigging and was holed by one hit below the waterline which flooded two coal bunkers. Another shell sent splinters into the conning tower of the  Lord Nelson, wounding Captain McClintock in the head.

During the attack Agamemnon was to be hit in total eight times  and the Lord Nelson seven times by heavy calibre shells. Despite the fifteen hits both ships crews suffered only slight wounds. The Lord Nelson was despatched  to Malta for repairs and was back on station by in time for the next assault  on the 18th March.

In preparation for the attack on the narrows on 18 March, the two ships formed the 2nd Sub Division of the First Division of the fleet. The First Division was first to enter the straits, and bombard the Turkish forts from long range.

The British plan for 18 March 1915 was to silence the defences guarding the first five lines of mines, which was to be removed overnight by the minesweepers. The next day the remaining defences around the Narrows would then be defeated and the last five minefields would be cleared. The battleships were arranged into three lines comprising of two British and one French, with the supporting ships on both flanks and two ships held in reserve.

The first British line opened fire from Eren Keui Bay at 11.00 approximately. Shortly after 12.00, the French line (Bouvet,  Charlemagne, Suffren, and Gaulois) passed through the British line and closed in on the Narrows forts. The Turkish fire began to take a toll with Gaulois, Suffren, Agamemnon and Inflexible all suffering hits. While the naval fire hadn't yet to destroy the Turkish batteries, it had successfully temporarily reduced their rate of fire. By 13.25 the Turkish defences were in the main silent and it was decided to withdraw the French line and bring forward the second British line, as well as Swiftsure and Majestic.

At 13.54 the Bouvet, having made a turn to starboard into Eren Keui Bay, struck a mine, capsized and sank, all within a couple of minutes, killing 600 men. The British reaction at first was that she'd been struck by a shell in her magazine or that she had been torpedoed. They remained, at this stage, unaware of the minefield proximity.

The British duly pressed on with their attack. At around 16.00 Inflexible began to withdraw from her position and struck a mine near where Bouvet went down, killing 30 men. The battlecruiser remained afloat and was eventually beached on the island of Tenedos.

HMS Irresistable was the next to strike a mine. As she drifted helplessly, the crew were taken off. HMS Ocean was ordered to take the Irresistible under tow but the water was thought to shallow to make an approach. At 18.05 Ocean also struck a mine which jammed her steering gear leaving her helpless to. The two abandoned battleships were still a float when the British finally withdrew. A destroyer later returned to torpedo the stricken vessels but despite searching for four hours, she could find no sign of them.

Agamemnon and Lord Nelson were fortunate to survive largely unscathed, although Agamemnon was hit by twelve 6in howitzer shells during the attack. On this occasion a 6-inch  howitzer battery opened fire on Agamemnon hitting her  the 12 times in 25 minutes. Five of the howitzer shells struck her armour and were to cause no damage, but the seven that struck her  exterior caused  significant  structural damage and temporarily put one of her 12-inch guns out of action.

On the 25th April both ships supported the Gallipoli landings. Lord Nelson was part of the First Squadron, supporting the landings at the tip of the peninsula and the Agamemnon was part of the Fifth Squadron, tasked with containing destroyers and minesweepers. Her job was to protect those ships as they operated inside the straits.

In action an against Ottoman field batteries, Agamemnon was to receive two more hits between 28 April and 30 April, and on the 1st May  she provided fire support for Allied troops during a Turkish counterattack. On the 6th May Agamemnon and Lord Nelson bombarded Ottoman artillery batteries  prior to the Second Battle of Krithia.

Between the months of May and June 1915, Agamemnon was refitted in Malta.

Lord Nelson was to relieve the battleship Queen Elizabeth as flagship of the British Dardanelles Squadron on 12 May, then flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Rosslyn Erskine-Wemyss. On 20 June, she bombarded both the docks and shipping at Gallipoli, aided in the spotting by a kite balloon, inflicting significant damage on the targets. Lord Kitchener brought his headquarters staff on board her in November and, on 22 December Lord Nelson hoisted the flag of Vice Admiral John de Roebeck when he succeeded Erskine-Wemyss.

On 2 December, Agamemnon with the protected cruiser Endymion and monitor M33 bombarded the Kavak bridge, destroying several spans of it and temporary severing  Ottoman communications to the Gallipoli Peninsula.

On the 5th May 1916 Agamemnon damaged the German Zeppelin LZ85  at Salonika with a shell from a 12-pounder and forced it to crash land in the Vardar marshes. The crew of 12 were all captured and the crafts framework was salvaged. It was partially reconstructed and put on display near the White Tower in Salonika.

Following the evacuation of Gallipoli, both ships were to  remain in the Mediterranean, and in January 1917 all the other British battleships were returned home to allow their crews  to man new destroyers and cruisers then coming into service. The majority of the Nelson's post Gallipoli war service saw the two sisters at Mudros, guarding against a possible breakout by the Turkish battlecruiser Yavuz Sultan Selim, or off Salonika, supporting the Allied forces in the Balkans. Lord Nelson was later given a short refit at Malta in October while Agamemnon remained behind at Mudros.

On 12 January 1918 Rear Admiral Hayes-Sadler raised his flag in Lord Nelson, and four days later she sailed to Salonika to allow the rear admiral to meet with the British Army commander General Milne. In the need of transportation to Salonika for the conference, and finding his personal yacht unavailable, Hayes-Sadler decided to have the Lord Nelson take him there. As a result she was not on station when the Yavuz Sultan Selim, (former Goeben) and Midilli (Breslau) finally made their breakout attempt on 20 January. The ship could not get back to the Dardanelles in time to participate in the resulting Battle of Imbros or intercept Yavuz Sultan Selim. The two 'Turkish' vessels were to both strike mines. Yavuz managed escaped back to sanctuary in the Dardanelles, but the Midilli was lost.

In 1918 Agamemnon underwent a refit at Malta. The Armistice of Mudros was signed by the Ottoman Empire on board Armageddon on the 30 October 1918, negotiation's having begun on board on the 27th. while she was anchored at Lemnos in the northern Aegean Sea.

With the Armistice signed, the two ships then passed through the Dardanelles to participate in the occupation of Constantinople (November 13, 1918 to September 23, 1923). After a call at  Sebastopol on 1 December HMS Agamemnon was to return home in March 1919, while Lord Nelson was to spend a short time in the Black Sea where she served as the flagship for the Black Sea squadron. After going to Constantinople HMS Temeraire and HMS Superb were sent to Sebastopol arriving there on 26 November 1918, in company with FS Justice and FS Democratie.
In April 1919, she took Grand Duke Nicholas and Grand Duke Peter of Russia from the Black Sea to Genoa. (Other sources credit HMS Marlborough with transporting the two Grand Dukes to Genoa).

After the war the pre-dreadnought battleships were no longer needed. Lord  Nelson was returned to the United Kingdom in May 1919 and was placed into reserve until August 1919, when she was placed on to the sale list. On 4 June 1920, she was sold to Stanlee Shipbreaking Company of Dover and  then resold to Slough Trading Company on 8 November 1920, and then sold again to a German scrap company. In January 1922 she was finally towed to Germany for scrapping.

After her return home, Agamemnon was paid off at Chatham Dockyard and went into reserve on 20 March 1919.

In September 1918, the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, Admiral David Beatty had requested a 'large target' be provided which would allow realistic gunnery practice for the battleships of the Grand Fleet. Tests against armour plate in 1919 demonstrated that firing 15-inch guns at any pre-dreadnought would most likely soon sink her, but the use 6-inch calibre  or smaller seemed practical. The first proposal was for the pre-dreadnought Hibernia to be used for target duties, but it  was finally settled on the Agamemnon when she became available.

Between 6 December 1920 and 8 April 1921 Agamemnon was refitted at Chatham Dockyard for use as a target ship. The ship was rewired for radio control and stripped of much of her fittings. The 12-inch turrets remained aboard, but all of her guns and their ancillary  equipment was removed, as was her torpedo equipment, flying deck, sea cabins, main derrick and boat equipment, lower conning tower, masts, yards, most of her crew amenities, and other unnecessary equipment. All the unnecessary hatches, coamings, scuttles, and lifts were removed and plated over, and she was ballasted differently from when she had been served as a battleship. The goal was not to sink her, so she was assigned a crew of 153 to maintain and operate her when she was not under fire.

Agamemnon's first target service took place before her modifications were even  completed on 19 March 1921. She was exposed to a cloud of poisonous gas to determine the effect of gas on a battleship. It was found after the 'attack' that the gas had entered   the ships interior via her numerous openings, but the ship had not actually  been sealed against a gas attack  before the trial was undertaken, so no accurate results relevant to  a battleship in commission  could be obtained. On 21 September, she was subjected to machine-gun fire by strafing aircraft. These trials showed that such strafing could harass a battleship, but would not impair her fighting or her ability to steam.

Agamemnon also was used to test the vulnerability of battleships to various calibre.   Shells ranging from 4.7" 5.5" inch and 6-inch were fired at the Agamemnon by a number of her peers, Renown and Repulse among them. Whilst under fire, and being manoeuvre by radio control, the other battleships fired at her. Numerous  tests showed that ships protected as well as Agamemnon would suffer damage to their upper works if struck by such shells, but would not have their steaming or fighting capability seriously impaired even by numerous smaller-caliber hits.

Agamemnon was in December 1926 relieved as target ship by the dreadnought Centurion. By that date she was the the last of her breed, the final British pre-dreadnought battleship in existence. She was sold to J Cashmore of Newport, South Wales on 24 January 1927 for scrap, and departed Portsmouth Dockyard on 1 March to be broken up at Newport.
There is one point in this that puzzles me. The names given to the two vessels have as far as I can see no obvious connection. Most of the vessels in British class names shared a connection within their individual classes. Whilst Agamennon is or was a name  familiar to the Royal Navy, how was that name linked to the Lord Neldon. Plus why Lord Nelson and not the Admiral Nelson. Or am I once again missing something obvious?

NELSONS CAPTAINS
DATES OF APPOINTMENTS ARE PROVIDED WHEN KNOW.
Captain Sir Robert K. Arbuthnot, Bart., 9 September, 1907 – 31 January, 1910
Captain Sackville H. Carden, 23 January, 1908–4 February, 1908  (lent from Agamemnon)
Captain Douglas R. L. Nicholson, 31 January, 1910– 31 March, 1910
Captain Alfred E. A. Grant, 31 March, 1910– 21 November, 1911
Captain Edmund H. Smith, 21 November, 1911 – 16 June, 1913
Captain Rowland Nugent, 16 June, 1913– 30 April, 1914
Captain John W. L. McClintock, 30 April, 1914– 19 July, 1916(and as Flag Captain)
Captain Robert N. Bax, June, 1916 – 28 February, 1918  (and as Flag Captain)
Captain Leonard L. P. Willan, 28 February, 1918– May, 1919 (and as Flag Captain to R/A Lambert)
Acting Captain Edward O. Cochrane, November, 1918 – 9 May, 1919.

AGAMEMNON'S CAPTAIN'S
DATE'S OF APPOINTMENT ARE PROVIDED WHEN KNOW.
Captain Sackville H. Carden, 21 May, 1907– 21 December, 1908  (lent to Lord Nelson in early 1908)
Captain Bernard Currey, 21 December, 1908– 5 April, 1910
Captain Edmund R. Pears, 5 April, 1910 – 21 December, 1911
Captain Arthur Hayes-Sadler, 21 December, 1911 – 1 January, 1914
Rear-Admiral Herbert A. S. Fyler, 1 January, 1914 – 29 January, 1917
Rear-Admiral Philip W. Dumas, 18 February, 1917– 17 October, 1918
Captain Frederick S. Litchfield-Speer, 25 September, 1918[ 14 April, 1919
Commander Oliver M. F. Stokes, 9 April, 1923– 6 November, 1923
Commander Oliver M. F. Stokes, 17 March, 1924– 23 February, 1925[37]
Commander Edward C. Stubbs, 23 February, 1925.

This work is the property of Andy South c/o Facebook, Andy's South Naval Post

[1]http://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/H.M.S._Agamemnon_(1906)
[2] Dreyer Fire Control Tables were early mechanical computers ("calculating workbenches" might be a better term) meant to process data to permit a ship to engage a distant target with heavy artillery. They were fairly involved pieces of equipment, and grew more intricate between the invention of the first prototype table in 1911, their first deployment on dreadnoughts in 1912 (?) and the creation of the Mark V table in 1918. The dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet relied on Dreyer equipment at Jutland to convert sporadic and imprecise estimates of range and bearing into workable firing parameters. Sadly, the level of success was spotty, as visibility conditions made such systematic data collection too occasional for performing the sort of graphical analysis on which the Dreyer relied.
The Dreyer FCTs were literally sturdy iron tables fitted with a number of fire control devices tied together by rotating shafts, bicycle chains and other linkages, worked by seven or more men simultaneously as a corporate endeavour. In the earlier and smaller versions, the mechanical integration of the components was less complete and required manual interaction.
Dreyer tables were housed deep within the ship in the Transmitting Station located beneath the armoured deck. By the time the Mark V table was fitted in H.M.S. Hood, as many as 30 people might occupy the TS, working the table and its many ancillary devices or serving as liaisons to the fighting positions of the ship. It is fair to suggest that the Dreyer and its environment and attendants resembled a premonition of the Mission Control centres of the Apollo program 50 years later: a human/machine system on a broad scale to factor down a torrent of real time sensory data to create a manageable environment for exerting command at a rate tolerable to humans. http://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/Dreyer_Fire_Control_Table.

[3] 'The suggestion that her building had been sped up by using guns and/or turrets originally designed for the Lord Nelson-class battleships which preceded her is not borne out as the guns and turrets were not ordered until July 1905. It seems more likely that Dreadnought's turrets and guns merely received higher priority than those of the earlier ships' (sources:Gardiner and Gray). But that said surely higher delay would impact on the Nelson's orders and delay them?

[4]The Trafalgar and Centurion classes had joined the fleet with 4.7 inch (120 mm) secondaries but had later had them replaced by 6 inch guns.